Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

Andreas Glöckner (), Bernd Irlenbusch (), Sebastian Kube, Andreas Nicklisch () and Hans-Theo Normann
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Andreas Glöckner: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bernd Irlenbusch: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Andreas Nicklisch: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

No 2009_08, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

Keywords: Experiments; Leadership; Reciprocity; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H40 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_08

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