Reveal it or conceal it: On the value of second opinions in a low-entry-barriers credence goods market

Parampreet Christopher Bindra (), Rudolf Kerschbamer, Daniel Neururer () and Matthias Sutter
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Parampreet Christopher Bindra: University of Innsbruck
Daniel Neururer: University of Innsbruck

No 2020_11, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Credence goods markets with their asymmetric information between buyers and sellers are prone to large inefficiencies. In theory, poorly informed consumers can protect themselves from maltreatment through sellers by asking for second opinions from other sellers. Yet, empir-ical evidence whether this is a successful strategy is scarce. Here we present a natural field experiment in the market for computer repairs. We find that revealing a second opinion from another expert to the seller does neither increase the rate of successful repairs nor decrease the average repair price. We assess under which conditions gathering a second opinion can be valuable

Keywords: Credence goods; expert services; second opinions; natural field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Reveal it or conceal it: On the value of second opinions in a low-entry-barriers credence goods market (2020)
Working Paper: Reveal it or conceal it: On the value of second opinions in a low-entry-barriers credence goods market (2020)
Working Paper: Reveal It or Conceal It: On the Value of Second Opinions in a Low-Entry-Barriers Credence Goods Market (2020)
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