The roots of cooperation

Zvonimir Bašic, Parampreet C. Bindra, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Angelo Romano, Matthias Sutter and Claudia Zoller
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Zvonimir Bašic: Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, UK
Parampreet C. Bindra: University of Innsbruck
Daniela Glätzle-Rützler: University of Innsbruck, Austria
Angelo Romano: Leiden University, Netherlands
Claudia Zoller: Management Center Innsbruck
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniela Glätzle-Rützler

No 2024_02, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We study the developmental roots of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest and is more effective as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that already children aged 3 act in a conditionally cooperative way. Yet, direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates beyond a control condition. Compared to the latter, punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, making it the most effective mechanism to promote cooperation. We also find that children’s cognitive skills and parents’ socioeconomic background influence cooperation. We complement our experimental findings with a meta-analysis of studies on cooperation among adults and older children, confirming that punishment outperforms direct and indirect reciprocity.

Keywords: Cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; children; parents; prisoner’s dilemma game; experiment; meta-analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 D01 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-neu and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The roots of cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
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