The Roots of Cooperation

Zvonimir Bašic, Parampreet Christopher Bindra, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Angelo Romano, Matthias Sutter and Claudia Zoller

No 9404, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment doubles cooperation rates in comparison to a control condition. Children also reciprocate others’ behavior, yet direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates. We also examine the influence of children’s cognitive skills and parents’ socioeconomic background on cooperation.

Keywords: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner’s dilemma game; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 D01 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-neu and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The roots of cooperation (2024)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The roots of cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: The Roots of Cooperation (2021)
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