Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

Lars Ehlers and John Weymark

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems.

Keywords: axiomatic social choice; candidate stability; litical economy; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/382 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice (2003)
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001)
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-30

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