Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

John Weymark

No 29, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: A voting procedure is candidate stable if no candidate would prefer to withdraw from an election when all of the other potential candidates enter. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton have recently established a number of theorems showing that candidate stability is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide a simple proof of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton's impossibility theorem for the case in which the voters and potential candidates have no one in common.

Keywords: Axiomatic social choice; candidate stability; political economy; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07, Revised 2001-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu00-w29R.pdf Revised version, 2001 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice (2003)
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001)
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0029

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