Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

Lars Ehlers and John Weymark

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 2, 233-243

Abstract: The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Axiomatic social choice; Candidate stability; Political economy; Voting.; JEL Classification Numbers:D71; D72. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001)
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001)
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0279-6

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