The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole

No 11156, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.

JEL-codes: L2 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
Note: CF PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Published as Chiang, Benjamin, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis" Rand Journal of Economics 38 (2007): 905 - 930.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis (2007)
Working Paper: The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis (2007)
Working Paper: The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: an Empirical Analysis (2006)
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