Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

No 11396, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex post incentives facing individual legislators, whose interests may be more parochial. We study how differences in "party discipline" shape fiscal policy choices. In particular, we examine the determinants of national spending on local public goods in a three-stage game of campaign rhetoric, voting, and legislative decision-making. We find that the rhetoric and reality of pork-barrel spending, and also the efficiency of the spending regime, bear a non-monotonic relationship to the degree of party discipline.

JEL-codes: D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Note: IFM ITI PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published as E. Helpman (ed.) Institutions and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics (2005)
Working Paper: Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics (2005)
Working Paper: Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics (2005)
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