When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms
James Rebitzer and
Lowell Taylor
No 12583, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We study the economics of employment relationships through theoretical and empirical analysis of an unusual set of firms, large law firms. Our point of departure is the "property rights" approach that emphasizes the centrality of ownership's legal rights to control important, non-human assets of the enterprise. From this perspective, large law firms are an interesting and potentially important object of study because the most valuable assets of these firms take the form of knowledge - particularly knowledge of the needs and interests of clients. We argue that the two most distinctive organizational features of large law firms, the use of "up or out" promotion contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm, emerge naturally in this setting. In addition to explaining otherwise anomalous features of the up-or-out partnership system, this paper suggests a general framework for analyzing organizations where assets reside in the brains of employees.
JEL-codes: J4 L2 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino and nep-knm
Note: LS IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Published as James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2007. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 201-229.
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12583.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms (2006) 
Working Paper: When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms (2006) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12583
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12583
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().