Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War

Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken

No 13102, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Assassinations are a persistent feature of the political landscape. Using a new data set of assassination attempts on all world leaders from 1875 to 2004, we exploit inherent randomness in the success or failure of assassination attempts to identify assassination's effects. We find that, on average, successful assassinations of autocrats produce sustained moves toward democracy. We also find that assassinations affect the intensity of small-scale conflicts. The results document a contemporary source of institutional change, inform theories of conflict, and show that small sources of randomness can have a pronounced effect on history.

JEL-codes: D74 F52 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
Note: EFG POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published as Benjamin F. Jones & Benjamin A. Olken, 2009. "Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 55-87, July.

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Journal Article: Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War (2009)
Working Paper: Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War (2007)
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