Does Employee Ignorance Undermine Shared Capitalism?

John Budd

No 14236, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The potential of shared capitalism to improve individual and organizational performance through financial incentives depends on employees knowing about and participating in compensation plans that link rewards to performance. This paper therefore analyzes a survey of employees from multiple companies to assess the extent to which employees are ignorant about company, group, and individual-based incentive pay plans and ESOPs. The findings reveal significant amounts of employee ignorance in both under- and overstating the extent to which such plans apply to them individually.

JEL-codes: J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Note: LS
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Published as Does Employee Ignorance Undermine Shared Capitalism? , John W. Budd. in Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options , Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi. 2010

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