The Disintermediation of Financial Markets: Direct Investing in Private Equity

Lily Fang, Victoria Ivashina and Josh Lerner

No 19299, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: One of the important issues in corporate finance is the rationale for and role of financial intermediaries. In the private equity setting, institutional investors are increasingly eschewing intermediaries in favor of direct investments. To understand the trade-offs in this setting, we compile a proprietary dataset of direct investments from seven large institutional investors. We find that solo investments by institutions outperform co-investments and a wide range of benchmarks for traditional private equity partnership investments. The outperformance is driven by deals where informational problems are not too severe, such as more proximate transactions to the investor and later-stage deals, and by an ability to avoid the deleterious effects on returns often seen in periods with large inflows into the private equity market. The poor performance of co-investments, on the other hand, appears to result from fund managers' selective offering of large deals to institutions for co-investing.

JEL-codes: G0 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Journal of Financial Economics Volume 116, Issue 1, April 2015, Pages 160–178 Cover image The disintermediation of financial markets: Direct investing in private equity ☆ Lily Fanga, Victoria Ivashinab, c, , , Josh Lernerb, c

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