The Behavioralist As Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance

Michael Hallsworth, John List, Robert Metcalfe () and Ivo Vlaev

No 20007, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Tax collection problems date back to the earliest recorded history of mankind. This paper begins with a simple theoretical construct of paying (rather than declaring) taxes, which we argue has been an overlooked aspect of tax compliance. This construct is then tested in two large natural field experiments. Using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the UK, we show that including social norms and public goods messages in standard tax payment reminder letters considerably enhances tax compliance. The field experiments increased taxes collected by the Government in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in increasing tax compliance.

JEL-codes: C93 H2 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-eur, nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (78)

Published as Hallsworth, Michael & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Vlaev, Ivo, 2017. "The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 14-31.

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Journal Article: The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance (2017)
Working Paper: The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance (2014)
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