Competition and Bank Opacity

Liangliang Jiang, Ross Levine () and Chen Lin

No 20760, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.

JEL-codes: D22 D4 G21 G28 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-com
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Liangliang Jiang & Ross Levine & Chen Lin, 2016. "Competition and Bank Opacity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1911-1942.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20760.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition and Bank Opacity (2016)
Working Paper: Competition and Bank Opacity (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20760

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20760

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().