Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game

Anthony Heyes and John List

No 21953, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: There is a large and diverse body of evidence that people condition their behavior on the characteristics of others. If type is visible then one agent seeing another with whom they are interacting, or observing some other close proxy for type, can affect outcomes. We explore the economics of revealing type in a simple laboratory experiment to learn about the underlying motivations for discrimination.

JEL-codes: C9 C91 D03 J71 J78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published as Anthony Heyes & John A. List, 2016. "Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 319-23, May.

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Journal Article: Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game (2016)
Working Paper: Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game (2016)
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