Who Gets Hired? The Importance of Finding an Open Slot

Edward Lazear, Kathryn Shaw and Christopher T. Stanton

No 22202, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A model of hiring into posted job slots suggests hiring is based on comparative advantage: being hired depends not only on one’s own skill but also on the skills of other applicants. The model has numerous implications. First, bumping of applicants occurs when one job-seeker is slotted into a lower paying job by another applicant who is more skilled. Second, less able workers are more likely to be unemployed because they are bumped. Third, vacancies are higher for harder to fill skilled jobs. Fourth, some workers are over-qualified for their jobs whereas others are under-qualified. These implications are borne out using four different data sets.

JEL-codes: D83 J01 J2 J21 J23 J24 J6 J62 J64 M5 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-ltv
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Who Gets Hired? The Importance of Competition among Applicants , Edward P. Lazear, Kathryn L. Shaw, Christopher T. Stanton. in Firms and the Distribution of Income: The Roles of Productivity and Luck , Lazear and Shaw. 2018

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