A Time to Make Laws and a Time to Fundraise? On the Relation between Salaries and Time Use for State Politicians

Mitchell Hoffman and Elizabeth Lyons

No 22571, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Paying higher salaries is often believed to enhance worker effort, leading workers to work harder to avoid getting fired. However, workers may also respond to higher salaries by focusing on tasks that most directly affect getting fired (as opposed to those that contribute most to productivity). We explore these issues by analyzing the relationship between the level of compensation and time use for US state legislators. Using data on time use and legislator salaries, we show that higher salary is associated with legislators spending more time on fundraising. In contrast, higher salary is also associated with less time spent on legislative activities and has no clear relation to time spent on constituent services. Subgroup analysis broadly supports our interpretation of the data.

JEL-codes: D72 H70 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lab
Note: LE LS PE POL PR
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Published as Mitchell Hoffman & Elizabeth Lyons, 2020. "A time to make laws and a time to fundraise? On the relation between salaries and time use for state politicians," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, vol 53(3), pages 1318-1358.

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