Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning In

Christine L. Exley, Muriel Niederle () and Lise Vesterlund

No 22961, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Gender differences in the propensity to negotiate are often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean-in.” We use a laboratory experiment to examine the effect of leaning-in. Despite men and women achieving similar and positive returns when they must negotiate, we find that women avoid negotiations more often than men. While this suggests that women would benefit from leaning-in, a direct test of the counterfactual proves otherwise. Women appear to positively select into negotiations and to know when to ask. By contrast, we find no significant evidence of a positive selection for men.

JEL-codes: C9 J01 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gen and nep-lab
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published as Christine L. Exley & Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2020. "Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning In," Journal of Political Economy, vol 128(3), pages 816-854.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning-in (2018)
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