Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers

Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers

No 2342, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The paper questions the common view that share price increases of firms involved in hostile takeovers measure efficiency gains from acquisitions. Even if such gains exist, most of the increase in the combined value of the target and the acquirer is likely to come from stakeholder wealth losses, such as declines in value of subcontractors' firm-specific capital or employees' human capital. The use of event studies to gauge wealth creation in takeovers is unjustified. The paper also suggests a theory of managerial behavior, in which hiring and entrenching trustworthy managers enables shareholders to commit to upholding implicit contracts with stakeholders. Hostile takeovers are an innovation allowing shareholders to renege on such contracts ex post, against managers' will. On this view, shareholder gains are redistributions from stakeholders, and can in the long run result in deterioration of trust necessary for the functioning of the corporation.

Date: 1987-08
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Published as Shleifer, Andrei and Lawrence H. Summers. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," From Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, edited by Alan J. Auerbach, pp. 33-56. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.
Published as Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers , Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers. in Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences , Auerbach. 1988

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