Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning
Roland Benabou,
Armin Falk and
Jean Tirole
No 24798, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
By downplaying externalities, magnifying the cost of moral behavior, or suggesting not being pivotal, exculpatory narratives can allow individuals to maintain a positive image when in fact acting in a morally questionable way. Conversely, responsibilizing narratives can help sustain better social norms. We investigate when narratives emerge from a principal or the actor himself, how they are interpreted and transmitted by others, and when they spread virally. We then turn to how narratives compete with imperatives (general moral rules or precepts) as alternative modes of communication to persuade agents to behave in desirable ways.
JEL-codes: D62 D64 D78 D83 D91 H41 K42 L14 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-law, nep-ltv, nep-mic and nep-soc
Note: DEV IO LE PE POL
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Related works:
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2019) 
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2018) 
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2018) 
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives and Moral Reasoning (2018) 
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2018) 
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