Belief Disagreement and Portfolio Choice

Maarten Meeuwis, Jonathan Parker, Antoinette Schoar and Duncan I. Simester

No 25108, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using proprietary portfolio data on millions of households, we show that (likely) Republicans increase the equity share and market beta of their portfolios following the 2016 presidential election, while (likely) Democrats rebalance into safe assets. We provide evidence that this behavior is driven by investors interpreting public information using different models of the world, by ruling out the main non-belief-based channels (like income hedging needs, preferences, local economic exposure) using detailed controls for ex ante wealth and investments, demographics and income, and even county-employer-period fixed effects. These findings are driven by a small share of investors making big changes in allocation, and are stronger among investors who are more attentive to their portfolios or who do not delegate their investment decisions.

JEL-codes: D14 D84 E71 G11 G12 G40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
Note: AG AP CF EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Published as MAARTEN MEEUWIS & JONATHAN A. PARKER & ANTOINETTE SCHOAR & DUNCAN SIMESTER, 2022. "Belief Disagreement and Portfolio Choice," The Journal of Finance, vol 77(6), pages 3191-3247.

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