Implicit and Explicit Commitment in Credit and Saving Contracts: A Field Experiment

Uzma Afzal, Giovanna d'Adda, Marcel Fafchamps, Simon Quinn and Farah Said ()

No 25802, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment to test the demand for flexibility and for soft and hard commitment among clients of a microfinance institution. We offer a commitment contract inspired by the rotating structure of a ROSCA. Additional treatments test ex ante demand for soft commitment (in the form of reminders), hard commitment (in the form of a penalty for missing an installment), and flexibility (an option to postpone an installment). Our design is unique in the literature for allowing us to test — using the same respondent population — how demand for explicit commitment features differs between loan and savings contracts. We find substantial demand for both credit and savings contracts but no demand for additional commitment features — either in isolation or in combination — in spite of their effectiveness in improving repayment. In particular, demand for savings is insensitive to explicit commitment features. Individuals offered loans actively dislike commitment and flexibility, unless the latter is combined with reminders. These findings complement a literature showing that commitment devices induce financial discipline. They show that demand for commitment depends on whether commitment features are implicit or explicit.

JEL-codes: G02 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-mfd
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Implicit and Explicit Commitment in Credit and Saving Contracts: A Field Experiment (2019)
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