Whitelashing: Black Politicians, Taxes, and Violence
Trevon Logan
No 26014, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
This paper provides the first evidence of the effect of tax policy on the likelihood of violent attacks against black politicians. I find a strong positive effect of local tax revenue on subsequent violence against black politicians. A dollar increase in per capita county taxes increases the likelihood of a violent attack by more than 25%. The result is robust to numerous economic, social, historical, and political factors. I also find that counties where black officeholders were attacked had the largest negative tax revenue changes between 1870 and 1880 and that violence against black politicians is unrelated to other forms of post-Reconstruction racial violence. This provides the first quantitative evidence that political violence at Reconstruction's end was related to black political efficacy.
JEL-codes: H2 H7 J10 N3 N90 R1 R51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-ure
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Published as Trevon D. Logan, 2023. "Whitelashing: Black Politicians, Taxes, and Violence," The Journal of Economic History, vol 83(2), pages 538-571.
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