Research Registries: Facts, Myths, and Possible Improvements

Eliot Abrams, Jonathan Libgober and John List

No 27250, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The past few decades have ushered in an experimental revolution in economics whereby scholars are now much more likely to generate their own data. While there are virtues associated with this movement, there are concomitant difficulties. Several scientific disciplines, including economics, have launched research registries in an effort to attenuate key inferential issues. This study assesses registries both empirically and theoretically, with a special focus on the AEA registry. We find that over 90% of randomized control trials (RCTs) in economics do not register, only 50% of the RCTs that register do so before the intervention begins, and the majority of these preregistrations are not detailed enough to significantly aid inference. Our empirical analysis further shows that using other scientific registries as aspirational examples is misguided, as their perceived success in tackling the main issues is largely a myth. In light of these facts, we advance a simple economic model to explore potential improvements. A key insight from the model is that removal of the (current) option to register completed RCTs could increase the fraction of trials that register. We also argue that linking IRB applications to registrations could further increase registry effectiveness.

JEL-codes: B41 C9 C91 C92 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Research Registries: Facts, Myths, and Possible Improvements (2020)
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