Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances?

Martin Goetz, Luc Laeven and Ross Levine ()

No 27442, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We evaluate the role of insider ownership in shaping banks’ equity issuances in response to the global financial crisis. We construct a unique dataset on the ownership structure of U.S. banks and their equity issuances and discover that greater insider ownership leads to less equity issuances. Several tests are consistent with the view that bank insiders are reluctant to reduce their private benefits of control by diluting their ownership through equity issuances. Given the connection between bank equity and lending, the results stress that ownership structure can shape the resilience of banks—and hence the entire economy—to aggregate shocks.

JEL-codes: G21 G28 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-fmk
Note: CF EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27442.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Do bank insiders impede equity issuances? (2021)
Working Paper: Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances? (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27442

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27442

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().