Reputation and Earnings Dynamics

Boyan Jovanovic (bj2@nyu.edu) and Julien Prat

No 28052, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Cyclical patterns in earnings can arise when contracts between firms and their workers are incomplete, and when workers cannot borrow or lend so as to smooth their consumption. Effort cycles generate occasional large changes in earnings. These large changes are transitory, consistent with recent empirical findings.

JEL-codes: E24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mac
Note: EFG
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Published as Boyan Jovanovic & Julien Prat, 2021. "Reputation and earnings dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, vol 191.

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Journal Article: Reputation and earnings dynamics (2021)
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