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Herding, Armed Conflict, and a Culture of Honor: Global Evidence

Yiming Cao, Benjamin Enke, Armin Falk, Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn

No 29250, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine the importance of norms of revenge and punishment in perpetuating armed conflicts. Our analysis leverages the ‘culture of honor’ hypothesis from social psychology, which posits that traditional herding practices generate moral systems conducive to revenge-taking. We find that the descendants of herders (i) experience more frequent civil and non-civil conflicts; (ii) are more likely to be involved in conflicts motivated by retaliation; and (iii) exhibit a greater emphasis on revenge-taking in contemporary surveys and historical folklore. Our evidence suggests that a traditional form of subsistence generated a functional morality that continues to shape conflict across the globe today.

JEL-codes: N0 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gro, nep-his and nep-isf
Note: DAE DEV POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: Herding, Warfare, and a Culture of Honor: Global Evidence (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Herding, Warfare, and A Culture of Honor: Global Evidence (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Herding, Warfare, and a Culture of Honor: Global Evidence (2021) Downloads
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