Clubs and Networks in Economics Reviewing

Scott Carrell, David Figlio and Lester Lusher

No 29631, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The network of economists who publish in leading journals is generally perceived as small, exclusive, and tightly knit. We study how author-editor and author-reviewer network connectivity and “match” influences editor decisions and reviewer recommendations of economic research at the Journal of Human Resources (JHR). Our empirical strategy employs several dimensions of fixed effects to overcome concerns of endogenous assignment of papers to editors and reviewers in order to identify causal impacts. Results show that clubs and networks play a large role in influencing both editor and reviewer decisions. Authors who attended the same PhD program, were ever colleagues with, are affiliates of the same NBER program(s), or are more closely linked via coauthorship networks as the handling editor are significantly more likely to avoid a desk rejection. Likewise, authors from the same PhD program or who previously worked with the reviewer are significantly more likely to receive a positive evaluation. We also find that sharing “signals” of ability, such as publishing in “top five”, attending a high ranked PhD program, or being employed by a similarly ranked economics department significantly influences editor decisions and/or reviewer recommendations.

JEL-codes: A11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-sog
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Clubs and Networks in Economics Reviewing (2024)
Working Paper: Clubs and Networks in Economic Reviewing (2023)
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