Peer Influence on West Point Cadets’ CivilWar Allegiances

Yuchen Guo, Matthew Jackson and Ruixue Jia

No 33093, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Do social networks and peer influence shape major life decisions in highly polarized settings? We explore this question by examining how peers influenced the allegiances of West Point cadets during the American Civil War. Leveraging quasi-random variations in the proportion of cadets from Free States, we analyze how cadets’ decisions about which army to join depended on the composition of their peers. We have three main findings. First, there was a strong and significant peer effect: a higher proportion of classmates from Free States significantly increased the likelihood that cadets from Slave States joined the Union Army. Second, the peer effect varies with geography, most notably with the slave population share in cadets’ home states or counties, and with cadets’ own slave ownership in 1860. Third, peer effects were amplified by shared experiences such as having served together in the Mexican-American War, continuous military service, and belonging to the same cohort, suggesting that sustained interaction is important.

JEL-codes: D81 D85 I28 N31 N41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
Note: DAE PE POL
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Working Paper: Peer Influence on West Point Cadets' Civil War Allegiances (2026)
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