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Macro-Level Institutions and Micro-Level Economic Behavior: A Meta-Meta Analysis of 1,126 Studies

Jason A. Aimone, Sheryl Ball, Esha Dwibedi, Jeremy Jackson and James West

No 33129, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We combine societal-level institutional measures from 51 countries between 1996 and 2017 with individual decision-making outcome data from 1,126 laboratory experiments in six meta-analyses to evaluate the effects of within-country institutional change on pro-social and Nash behavior. We find that government effectiveness and regulatory freedom positively correlate with pro-social behavior. We find that freedom from each of the following components of regulation; interest rate controls, binding minimum wages, worker dismissal protections, conscription, and administrative requirements; are correlated with prosocial behavior and are inversely correlated with Nash behavior. These results suggest the importance of considering spillover effects in pro-social behavior when designing government policy.

JEL-codes: C91 H1 P5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-lma
Note: DEV PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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