How Good is AI at Twisting Arms? Experiments in Debt Collection

James J. Choi, Dong Huang, Zhishu Yang and Qi Zhang

No 33669, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How good is AI at persuading humans to perform costly actions? We study calls made to get delinquent consumer borrowers to repay. Regression discontinuity and a randomized experiment reveal that AI is substantially less effective than human callers. Replacing AI with humans six days into delinquency closes much of the gap. But borrowers initially contacted by AI have repaid 1% less of the initial late payment one year later and are more likely to miss subsequent payments than borrowers who were always called by humans. AI’s lesser ability to extract promises that feel binding may contribute to the performance gap.

JEL-codes: D14 G4 G51 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
Note: CF LS PR
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