EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Utilitarian or Quantile-Welfare Evaluation of Health Policy?

Charles Manski and John Mullahy

No 34247, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper considers quantile-welfare evaluation of health policy as an alternative to utilitarian evaluation. Manski (1988) originally proposed and studied maximization of quantile utility as a model of individual decision making under uncertainty, juxtaposing it with maximization of expected utility. That paper's primary motivation was to exploit the fact that maximization of quantile utility requires only an ordinal formalization of utility, not a cardinal one. This paper transfers these ideas from analysis of individual decision making to analysis of social planning. We begin by summarizing basic theoretical properties of quantile welfare in general terms rather than related specifically to health policy. We then propose a procedure to nonparametrically bound the quantile welfare of health states using data from binary-choice time-tradeoff (TTO) experiments of the type regularly performed by health economists. After this we assess related econometric considerations concerning measurement, using the EQ-5D framework to structure our discussion.

JEL-codes: I1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09
Note: EH PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34247.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34247

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34247
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-09-18
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34247