The Morality of Market Exchanges: Between Societal Values and Tradeoffs

Julio Elias, Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis

No 34647, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Certain behaviors in markets are unambiguously unethical. In other cases, however, voluntary exchanges that can create gains from trade remain contested on moral grounds, because of what is traded or of the price at which the exchange occurs. This chapter offers a framework to analyze these contested markets and provides examples of two general instances. First, we examine “repugnant” transactions involving the human body—such as compensated organ donation and gestational surrogacy—where concerns about dignity, exploitation, and inequality conflict with welfare gains from expanding supply. Second, we study price gouging in emergencies, where demands for a “just price” clash with the incentive and allocation roles of price adjustments under scarcity. Across both cases, we synthesize evidence on societal attitudes and highlight how support for policy options depends on perceived trade-offs between autonomy, fairness and efficiency, and on institutional features that can separate compensation from allocation.

JEL-codes: A10 D63 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
Note: POL
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