Monopsony, Markdowns, and Minimum Wages

Ester Faia, Benjamin Lochner and Benjamin Schoefer

No 34699, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper presents the first direct test of two interlinked predictions at the core of the monopsony theory of the labor market: (i) that firms exploit wage-setting power by marking down wages below the marginal revenue product of labor, and (ii) that exogenous wage constraints, if binding, eliminate markdowns. Our research design revisits the 2015 introduction of a high minimum wage in Germany. Drawing on a monopsony model, we derive an empirically tractable difference-in-differences specification that provides a quantitative benchmark for the firm-level markdown response. Our main result is that empirical markdowns respond only 0–25% as much as the monopsony model would have predicted. Hence, at least for the labor market segment we study, (i) markdowns largely reflect other distortions than monopsony, (ii) markdowns are mismeasured, (iii) minimum wages induce widespread labor shortages, or (iv) the standard monopsony model does not provide a full, realistic account of the labor market.

JEL-codes: E0 J0 L0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-inv
Note: EFG IO LS PR
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34699.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34699

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34699
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().