Multi-Project Collaborations

Charles Angelucci and Roi Orzach

No 35460, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze collaborative experimentation across multiple independent domains. Each domain contains infinitely many potential projects with asymmetric benefits. In each period and in each domain, two players can idle, jointly explore a new project, or jointly exploit a known one, with voluntary transfers. For intermediate discount factors, treating domains as independent during experimentation is suboptimal. The optimal experimentation policy exhibits common features of collaborative experimentation: lengthy exploration, temporary project exploitation, recall of past projects, and inefficient initial or terminal idling within certain domains. We connect these findings to research on buyer-supplier dynamics and persistent productivity differences.

JEL-codes: D21 D70 D83 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
Note: POL PR
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w35460.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35460

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w35460
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().