A Note on Internationally Coordinated Policy Packages Intended to be Robust Under Model Uncertainty

Jeffrey Frankel, Scott Erwin and Katharine Rockett

No 3747, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Holtham and Hughes Hallett, and a number of other authors, have suggested that a printout of all 1,000 cases of coordination considered in Frankel and Rockett (1988) should be made available. They wish to check whether, if coordination is restricted to policy packages that they call 'strong' bargains, it would raise welfare a higher percentage of the time. We now make those results available. The results show that if coordination is restricted to packages that are robust with respect to model uncertainty, such as the so-called 'strong' bargains, it does indeed improve the odds in favor of gains from coordination.

Date: 1991-06
Note: ITI IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published as "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model: Reply," American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 4,pp. 1052-1056 (September 1992).

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3747.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3747

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3747

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().