The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages

Peter Cramton, Morley Gunderson () and Joseph Tracy

No 5105, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to March 1993, we find that wages and strikes are substantially influenced by labor policy. In particular, we find that prohibiting the use of replacement workers during strikes is associated with significantly higher wages, and more frequent and longer strikes. This is consistent with private information theories of bargaining. We estimate the welfare consequences of a ban on replacement workers, as well as other labor policies. Despite the higher dispute costs, union workers are better off with a ban on replacement workers. The higher wage more than compensates for the more frequent and longer strikes.

JEL-codes: J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-05
Note: LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 81, no.3 (August 1999),pp.475-487.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages (1999)
Working Paper: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages (1998)
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