The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model

Theodore Eisenberg and Henry S. Farber

No 7296, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a model of the plaintiff's decision to file a law suit that has implications for how differences between the federal government and private litigants and litigation translate into differences in trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial. Our case selection model generates a set of predictions for relative trial rates and plaintiff win rates depending on the type of case and whether the government is defendant or plaintiff. In order to test the model, we use data on about 350,000 cases filed in federal district court between 1979 and 1997 in the areas of personal injury and job discrimination where the federal government and private parties work under roughly similar legal rules. We find broad support for the predictions of the model.

JEL-codes: K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, 2003. "The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 94-133.

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Journal Article: The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model (2003)
Working Paper: The Government As Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model (1999)
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