150 Years of Patent Office Practice

Josh Lerner

No 7477, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: An extensive theoretical literature has examined the impact of information problems on interactions between government bodies and private firms. One little-explored empirical testing ground is the patent system. This paper examines the administrative practices of patent offices in sixty countries over a 150-year period. I show that the usage of patent renewal fees and other mechanisms to grant discretion to patentees is consistent with theoretical suggestions. Nations where information asymmetries between government officials and patentees are likely to be more prevalent-larger countries, wealthier economies, and those where international trade is more important-incorporate discretionary features into their patent systems more frequently. I also find evidence that policymakers are more likely to restrict patent office officials' flexibility and to divide the responsibility for determining patentability between the patent office and the courts when information problems are likely to be severe.

JEL-codes: O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-his, nep-ino and nep-tid
Note: PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Josh Lerner, 2005. "150 Years of Patent Office Practice," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 112-143.

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