Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets

Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman

No 8086, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Consider a durable goods producer that potentially has market power in the aftermarkets associated with its products. An important question is to what extent, if any, should the antitrust laws restrict the firm's behavior in these aftermarkets? In this paper we explore a number of models characterized by either competition or monopoly in the new-unit market, and show that a variety of behaviors that hurt competition in aftermarkets can, in fact, be efficient responses to potential inefficiencies that can arise in aftermarkets. Our results should give courts pause before intervening in aftermarkets.

JEL-codes: L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Carlton, Dennis W. and Michael Waldman. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (April 2009).

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets (2010)
Working Paper: Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets (2000)
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