Links and Hyperlinks: An Empirical Analysis of Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999

Dan Elfenbein and Josh Lerner

No 8251, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines the structure of over 100 alliances by Internet portals from 1995 to 1999. These alliances were an attractive empirical testing ground because of the large number and heterogeneous nature of the contracts, the high standards for disclosure in the industry, and the careful delineation of ownership, control, exclusivity, and other provisions in the contracts. The division of ownership and allocation of control rights displayed patterns consistent with the predictions in the incomplete contracting literature. Similarly, the exclusivity of the agreements appeared to vary, at least weakly, with the value of the product or service being made available to the portal, consistent with the licensing literature. In other cases, particularly in regard to the differing allocation of ownership and control and the varying completeness of the contracts, the empirical patterns indicated a more complex world than the one that theory led us to anticipate.

JEL-codes: L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04
Note: CF IO PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as "Ownership and Control Rights in Internet Portal Alliances," Rand Journal of Economics, 34 (Summer 2003) 356-369.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8251.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8251

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8251

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().