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Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War

Dora Costa and Matthew Kahn ()

No 8627, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: What motivated men to risk death in the most horrific war in U.S. history when pay was low and irregular and military punishment strategies were weak? In such a situation creating group loyalty by promoting social capital is of paramount importance and in the Civil War was the cement of both armies. We find that individual and company socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ideology, and morale were important predictors of group loyalty in the Union Army. Company characteristics were more important than ideology or morale. Soldiers in companies that were more homogeneous in ethnicity, occupation, and age were less likely to shirk.

JEL-codes: L39 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
Note: DAE
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Published as Costa, Dora L. and Matthew E. Kahn. "Cowards And Heroes: Group Loyalty In The American Civil War," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, v118(2,May), 519-548.

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