Courts: the Lex Mundi Project
Simeon Djankov (),
Rafael La Porta (),
Florencio Lopez- de-Silane and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()
No 8890, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
JEL-codes: K10 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: CF PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32) Track citations by RSS feed
Published as Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. “Courts." Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2003.
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Courts: the Lex Mundi Project (2003)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2003)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi project (2002)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8890
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().