Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31

Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor

No 9345, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: What determines sovereign risk? We study the London bondmarket from the 1870s to the 1930s. Our findings support conventional wisdom concerning the low credibility of the interwar gold standard. Before 1914 gold standard adherence effectively signalled credibility and shaved 40 to 60 basis points from country borrowing spreads. In the 1920s, however, simply resuming prewar gold parities was insufficient to secure such benefits. Countries that devalued before resumption were treated favorably, and markets scrutinized other signals. Public debt and British Empire membership were important determinants of spreads after World War One, but not before.

JEL-codes: F2 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11
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Published as Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan M. Taylor. "Sovereign Risk, Credibility And The Gold Standard: 1870-1913 Versus 1925-31," Economic Journal, 2003, v113(487,Apr), 241-275.

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Journal Article: Sovereign risk, credibility and the gold standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31 (2003)
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31 (2003)
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31 (2003)
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31 (2003)
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31 (2003)
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