Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from "Weakest Link"

Steven Levitt

No 9449, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In most settings, it is difficult to measure discrimination, and even more challenging to distinguish between competing theories of discrimination (taste-based versus information-based). Using contestant voting behavior on the television game show Weakest Link, one can in principle empirically address both of these questions. On the show, contestants answer questions and vote off other players, competing for a winner-take-all prize. In early rounds, strategic incentives encourage voting for the weakest competitors. In later rounds, the incentives reverse, and the strongest competitors become the logical target. Controlling for other observable characteristics including the number of correct answers thus far, both theories of discrimination predict that in early rounds, excess votes will be made against groups targeted for discrimination. In later rounds, however, taste-based models predict continued excess votes, whereas statistical discrimination predicts fewer votes against the target group. Empirically, I find some evidence of information-based discrimination towards Hispanics (i.e., other players perceive them as having low ability) and taste-based discrimination against older players (i.e., other players treat them with animus). There is little in the data to suggest discrimination against women and Blacks.

JEL-codes: J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-mic
Note: LE LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Levitt, Steven D. "Testing Theories Of Discrimination: Evidence From Weakest Link," Journal of Law and Economics, 2004, v47(2,Oct), 431-452.

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