Spaghetti Regionalism or Strategic Foreign Trade: Some Evidence for Mexico

Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez

No 9692, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina. Criticism of multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from the ability of a country to administer them. Mexico's multiple agreements have generally used the principle of NAFTA consistency, after the acceptance that NAFTA became a broader and deeper accord than results of the Uruguay multilateral achievements. An analysis of multiple RTAs is presented, including a game model of equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign trade policy.

JEL-codes: F1 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05
Note: ITI
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as Ibarra-Yunez, Alejandro. "Spaghetti Regionalism Or Strategic Trade: Some Evidence For Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, 2003, v72(2,Dec), 567-584.

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