 Road Pricing with Autonomous LinksLei Zhang and David Levinson No 200506, Working Papers from University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group Abstract: This research examines road pricing on a network of autonomous highway links. By autonomous it is meant that the links are competitive and independent, with the objective of maximizing their own profits without regard for either social welfare or the profits of other links. The principal goal of the research is to understand the implications of adoption of road pricing and privatization on social welfare and the distribution of gains and losses. The specific pricing strategies of autonomous links are evaluated first under the condition of competition for simple networks. An agent-based modeling system is developed which integrates an equilibrated travel demand, route choice, and travel time model with a repeated game of autonomous links setting prices to maximize profit. The levels of profit, welfare consequences, and potential cooperative arrangements undertaken by autonomous links will be evaluated. By studying how such an economic system may behave under various circumstances, the effectiveness of road pricing and road privatization as public policy can be assessed. Keywords: Network dynamics; road pricing; autonomous links; privatization; agent-based transportation model (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of the Transportation Research Board #1932 pp. 147-155. Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nex:wpaper:autonomouspricing Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group Contact information at EDIRC. |
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