Governance choice on a serial network

Feng Xie and David Levinson

No 200904, Working Papers from University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group

Abstract: This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts. While the first model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second explicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between benefits and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that governance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally.

Keywords: Governance choice; Transportation; Infrastructure; Fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D83 D85 O33 R40 R42 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Public Choice 141:189-212, doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9448-5

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http://hdl.handle.net/11299/179984 First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Governance choice on a serial network (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nex:wpaper:governancechoice

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