Social closeness can help, harm and be irrelevant in solving pure coordination problems
Fabio Tufano () and
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Simon Gaechter: University of Nottingham, IZA Bonn
Christian Thoeni: University of Lausanne
Till Weber: Newcastle University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simon Gächter () and
No 2021-09, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham
Experimental research has shown that ordinary people often perform remarkably well in solving coordination games that involve no conflicts of interest. While most experiments in the past studied such coordination games among socially distant anonymous players, here we study behaviour in a set of two player coordination games and compare the outcomes depending on whether the players are socially close or socially distant. We find that social closeness influences prospects for coordination, but whether it helps, harms or has no impact on coordination probabilities, depends on the structure of the game.
Keywords: Coordination; Lab-in-the-field experiment; Oneness; Salience; Social closeness; Social distance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Social closeness can help, harm and be irrelevant in solving pure coordination problems (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2021-09
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